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Abstract
This Essay examines the Belfast Agreement (or “Agreement”) in the light of international law
on self-determination and minority rights. Northern Ireland cannot be evaluated in a vacuum; al-
ready it is being suggested that the Northern Ireland peace process and the formula devised in the
1998 Belfast Agreement may serve as a model for other divided societies. Indeed, this possibil-
ity was raised by President Clinton during his September 1998 visit to Belfast and was reiterated
by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights on her more recent visit in December 1998.
International law claims to address many of the issues central to ethnic conflict, preeminently self-
determination, the legitimate basis for statehood, the exercise of state power, territorial integrity,
and the cultural rights of groups and individuals. By comparing international law and the Belfast
Agreement, this Essay examines whether the international instruments provide a useful measuring
stick, or indeed whether the Belfast Agreement has anything to contribute to the current interna-
tional debate on self-determination versus minority rights.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay examines the Belfast Agreement' (or "Agree-
ment") in the light of international law on self-determination
and minority rights. Northern Ireland cannot be evaluated in a
vacuum; already it is being suggested that the Northern Ireland
peace process and the formula devised in the 1998 Belfast Agree-
ment may serve as a model for other divided societies. Indeed,
this possibility was raised by President Clinton during his Sep-
tember 1998 visit to Belfast and was reiterated by the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights on her more recent visit in De-
cember 1998. International law claims to address many of the
issues central to ethnic conflict, preeminently self-determina-
tion, the legitimate basis for statehood, the exercise of state
power, territorial integrity, and the cultural rights of groups and
individuals. By comparing international law and the Belfast
Agreement, this Essay examines whether the international in-
struments provide a useful measuring stick, or indeed whether
the Belfast Agreement has anything to contribute to the current
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international debate on self-determination versus minority
rights.
This exercise is not just a simple comparison of political
agreement on one hand and law on the other. A review of the
present state of the field in the study of ethnic conflict reveals
that politics and law often intersect, complement, and, at times,
overlap. As one commentator has argued, by claiming to regu-
late aspects of ethnic disputes, international law in fact shapes
the dispute and becomes a vital part of the way that actors en-
gage both with one another and with international mecha-
nisms.2 Failure to understand this inextricable link often leaves
those seeking to clarify the appropriate role of international law
at the wrong starting point.' This attempt to offer a situated
analysis is also an attempt to demonstrate the interaction be-
tween the different players with regard to self-determination and
minority rights, international law and negotiated agreement, a
point that we return to later.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND
MINORITY RIGHTS
The demands posed by ethno-nationalist disputes have ex-
posed the limitations, both practical and legal, of international
law relating to self-determination. These limitations center
around international law's distinctions between "peoples" and
"minorities," and the remedies available to either a people or a
minority who are effectively excluded from government
processes and fair treatment.
All the international documents that set standards in the
area of self-determination refer to self-determination as a right
of "peoples." The United Nations Charter refers to self-determi-
nation of peoples in Article 1(2), stating that one of the pur-
poses of the United Nations is to "develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples."4 Article 1 of both the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
2. Nathaniel Berman, The International Law of Nationalism: Group Identity and Legal
History, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 25 (David Wippman ed., 1998).
3. Id. at 28.
4. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2).
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Rights ("ICESCR") states that "all peoples have the right of self-
determination ... to freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." 5
The two main U.N. General Assembly Resolutions dealing with
self-determination, the Colonial Declaration No. 1514 (or "Dec-
laration 1514") and the Friendly Relations Declaration No. 2625
(or "Declaration 2625"), provide further articulation of the right
to self-determination as belonging to "peoples. '6 That said, no-
where in international law is a "people" defined, and this lack of
a definition allows ethno-nationalist groups to claim such status
and therefore self-determination.
International instruments, however, seem to contemplate a
distinction between peoples and ethnic minorities.' Espiell, a
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, argued in his re-
port to the United Nations that "[s] elf-determination is essen-
tially a right of peoples .... It is peoples as such which are enti-
tled to the right to self-determination. Under contemporary in-
ternational law minorities do not have this right."' Despite this
conclusion, it has been argued that the definition of "peoples" is
not limited to the entire people of a territory, such as the peo-
ples of a colony.9 This alternative definition of "peoples" is fur-
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.'2200A (XXI), art. 1; U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 165, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). [hereinafter ICESCR].
6. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
People, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960) [hereinafter Colonial Declaration 1514]; Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.
Supp. No. 28, at 123, Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration
2625]; see also U.N. CHARTER arts. 2.4, 55; ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 1 (3), 999 U.N.T.S. at
173, 6 I.L.M. at 369; ICESCR, supra note 5, art. 1(3), at 165; Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action (World Conference on Human Rights), art. 2(1), U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 157/24 (1993).
7. For example, while Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR") establishes a right to self-determination for "peoples," Article 27 gives
members of minority groups only "the right, in community with the other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to
use their own language." ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179, 6 I.L.M. at
375.
8. HECTOR ESPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 9, para. 56 (1980).
9. Robert McCorquodale, Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach, 43 INT'L &
13471999]
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ther supported by instruments relating to indigenous peoples
that have blurred the distinction between peoples and minorities
by their use of the term "peoples" for indigenous groups who are
almost always minorities within states."
A second difficulty with delimiting the normative scope of
the self-determination norm lies in evaluating the permissible
remedy for a self-determination claim. While self-determination
is often associated with independent statehood as an outcome,
self-determination is only one of a number of possibilities men-
tioned in international instruments. Both the Colonial Declara-
tion No. 1514 and the Friendly Relations Declaration No. 2625
identify several possible means of exercising the right of self-de-
termination: emergence as a sovereign independent state, free
association with an independent state, integration with an in-
dependent state, and "any other political status freely deter-
mined."" The key is that the choice should be free and volun-
tary and "expressed through informed and democratic
processes." International practice has also established that vari-
eties of territorial change by consent can occur. Examples in-
clude the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
in 1991, the "velvet divorce" of Czechoslovakia into its two con-
stituent republics, and the reunification of Germany. 2
COMP. L.Q. 857 (1994); ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES (1995); see
Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-determination with Some Remarks
on Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 114-119, 124-131 (Christian
Tomuschat ed., 1993); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-determination: A Territorial Inter-
pretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991) (arguing, in essence, that link between self-
determination and territoriality is not close enough, due in part to the definitions of
"peoples" as holders of the right).
10. See, e.g., Convention Connecting Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independ-
ent Countries, International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 169, June 27,
1989, arts. 1.1, 1.2, 28 I.L.M. 1382, 1384 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991) (although
Article 1.3 denies that this has any implications as to rights, in an oblique reference to
self-determination); United Nations Draft Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2/1992/33, Aug. 20, 1992 (referring to the holders of rights as "peo-
ples"); Christian Tomuschat, Self-determination in a Post-Colonial World, in MODERN LAw
OF SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 9, at 13 (stating that "at least verbally, it brings indig-
enous populations close to peoples that are undeniably holders of the right of self-
determination").
11. Friendly Relations Declaration 2625, supra note 6.
12. See Asbjorn Eide, A Review and Analysis of Constructive Approaches to Group Accom-
modation and Minority Protection in Divided or Multicultural Societies, Forum for Peace and
Reconciliation/Foram um Shiochain agus Athmhuintearas, CONSULTANCY STUDIES No.
3, July 1996. This practice is recognized by the United Nations and the OSCE; see also
THOMAS MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES (1997).
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In fact, secession as an outcome is clearly in conflict with
the principle of territorial integrity, which has a clear prior place
in the norm. Both declarations establish self-determination ex-
plicitly with the caveat that its exercise should not disrupt "terri-
torial integrity. '"" This central paradox of the self-determination
norm, whereby it claims to grant both peoples and states rights
that may be incompatible, has been described as its 'Janus-like"
nature. 4 This paradox leads to a situation where "[m]inorities
appropriate the language of self-determination whether govern-
ments approve or not."15 This is reinforced by the possible ca-
veat to the principle of territorial integrity, which fuels the
claims of ethnic groups within states. The Friendly Relations
Declaration No. 2625 and the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action link the principle of territorial integrity to the
conducting of representative government. Declaration 2625
states that territorial integrity attaches to "sovereign and in-
dependent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as de-
scribed above and thus possessed of a government representing
the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction
as to race, creed or colour. ' 16 While Declaration 2625 marked
an attempt to universalize the self-determination norm and to
extend it from colonial situations, it also opened up the question
of how representative a government has to be to earn its claim to
territorial integrity. Further, it is unclear what the remedy for
unrepresentative government is, as no clear means for attaining
self-determination are specified. Cassese has suggested that, for
the most part, it involves a right to representative government,
13. Colonial Declaration 1514 states that "[a]ny attempt aimed at the partial or
total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incom-
patible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." Colo-
nial Declaration 1514, supra note 6, art. 6. Friendly Relations Declaration 2625 states
that "[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs [dealing with self-determination] shall be
construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States .... " Friendly Relations Declaration 2625, supra note 6, at 123.
14. CASSESE, supra note 9, at 5.
15. Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of In-
ternational Instruments, 38 INr'L & COMP. L.Q. 867, 868 (1989).
16. Friendly Relations Declaration 2625, supra note 6, at 122. This is effectively re-
stated in Article 2.3 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Vienna Dec-
laration and Programme of Action (World Conference on Human Rights), supra note
6, art. 2.3, at 1665.
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or internal self-determination, but that secession is possibly avail-
able in exceptional circumstances involving gross breaches of
fundamental human rights. 1
7
The claims of ethnic minorities are further fueled by the
fact that the political realities of a self-determination claim are,
on occasion, endorsed retrospectively even when the legal crite-
ria are not strictly fulfilled, as was the situation in the former
Yugoslavia.' 8 Thus, despite previous attempts by western states
to resist the formation of new ethnically-based nation states, the
international community ultimately did accept these as member
states, even though they had emerged unilaterally. This fact, to-
gether with international law's acknowledgment that "peoples"
struggling against "colonial domination and alien occupation
and against racist regimes"19 have a license to use force, gives
minority groups ajustification for the use of force, whether they
technically constitute a "peoples" or not.
Trying to extract a clear normative content from interna-
tional instruments is not an easy task. Cassese, locating his nor-
mative evaluation clearly in the context of its historical and polit-
ical background, suggests that "self-determination appears firmly
entrenched in the corpus of international general rules in only
three areas: as an anti-colonialist standard, as a ban on foreign
military occupation and as a standard requiring that racial
groups be given full access to government. '20 However, he sug-
gests that these rules have an overarching principle that "tran-
scends, and gives unity to" these customary rules, and "cast[s]
light on borderline situations. "21 Self-determination, according
to this principle, requires "a free and genuine expression of the
will of the people concerned." Nonetheless, Cassese notes that
this principle "neither points to the various specific areas in
17. See CASSESE, supra note 9, at 108-125; see also MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMI-
NATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 39 (1982).
18. See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
29, 30 (Catherine Brolmann et al. eds., 1993) (stating that "even if international law
does not authorize secession, it will eventually recognize the reality once it has occurred
and been made effective")
19. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1),
June 8, 1977, art. 1(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 6, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1396 (1977); see also Friendly
Relations Declaration 2625, supra note 6, at 123.
20. CASSESE, supra note 9, at 319.
21. Id.
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which self-determination should apply, nor to the final goal of
self-determination (internal self-government, independent state-
hood, association with or integration into another State)."2"
The "lacunae, ambiguities and loopholes" in the current
legal regulation of self-determination leave it open to other
groups, such as ethnic or national minority groups within state
territories, to claim a right to self-determination. 23 Moreover,
the norm's inability to address the situation of divided societies
gives it an "internal instability. 21 4 Ethnic groups, whose need for
effective participation in government and public life is not ad-
dressed, can often increasingly mount strong arguments that
principles of self-determination, such as the need for representa-
tive government, if objectively applied, would grant them in-
dependent statehood, and secession. 25 Northern Ireland is a
case in point. A traditional legal approach would dismiss the
claims of Nationalists to Irish Unity as those of a minority within
the internationally-accepted borders of Northern Ireland. Given
the self-determination norm's affirmation of "territorial integ-
rity," this would mean that the people of Northern Ireland (in
effect a Unionist majority) must agree to any change in its status,
with the consent of any other implicated state, that is Britain,
and, depending on the change contemplated, Ireland.2 6 How-
ever, Nationalists can point to the lack of a clear ending to colo-
nial occupation in Northern Ireland, continual emergency legis-
lation, systematic discrimination against the Catholic minority as
regards civil, political, social, and economic rights, and a general
lack of "representative government" both during Direct rule and
the Stormont Parliament that preceded it. Given the ambigui-
ties of the norm, these factors can be used to mount a self-deter-
mination claim to Irish unity.27 Application of self-determina-
tion law, therefore, invites a restatement of the political self-de-
termination dispute in terms of who is the appropriate "people"
and what is the proper territorial unit for adjudicating the self-
22. Id. at 320.
23. Id. at 327.
24. ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
25. See Thornberry, supra note 15.
26. See, e.g., Eide, supra note 12.
27. See, e.g., Richard Harvey, The Rights of the People of the Whole of Ireland to Self-
determination, Unity, Sovereignty and Independence, 1I N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 167
(1990).
1999] 1351
1352 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1345
determination claim. It does not satisfactorily resolve the dis-
pute.
The need for international law to respond effectively to
ethno-national disputes has led commentators to explore possi-
ble re-interpretations of the "breadth" of the notion of self-deter-
mination through the idea of "internal self-determination."2"
The concept of "internal self-determination" involves an evolu-
tionary approach to the principle of self-determination with a
focus on finding ways of enabling groups to decide their own
political status and form of government. In divided societies, it
is suggested that the rhetoric and underlying rationales of the
notion of self-determination can support the development of
policies of group accommodation such as autonomy regimes, or
other minority protection less than secession. This theory con-
stitutes an attempt to link the concepts Of self-determination and
minority rights through a notion of internal self-determination
that defies traditional international legal dichotomies of sover-
eign statehood and secession, or domestic state matter and legiti-
mate area of international interference. 29 It is an approach that
is consistent with the underlying idea of self-determination as a
notion of effective participation in government. It also means
that the self-determinationnorm, rather than assuming homoge-
neity within territories, is responsive to the political reality of het-
erogeneous societies with minority populations. Despite these
developments, it is certainly too early to talk of a legal "right" to
internal self-determination. Internal self-determination does,
however, find increasing support in proliferating international
instruments on minority rights, which as some commentators
have argued, may be "international law's long-term response to
ethnic conflict. 3 0
Minority rights protection is most fully articulated and ex-
tended in the recent U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Mi-
norities,"' and by both the Council of Europe's Framework Con-
28. See, e.g., McCorquodale, supra note 9. See generally HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY,
SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION (1990); Tomuschat, supra note 10, at 11-17;
Thornberry, supra note 15.
29. See CASSESE, supra note 9, at 341-365.
30. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Pushing the Limits of the Liberal Peace: Ethnic Conflict and
the 'Ideal Polity', in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 134.
31. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Reli-
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vention on the Protection of National Minorities ("Framework
Convention") and CSCE (now OSCE) documents that preceded
it.32 The U.N. Declaration as a General Assembly Resolution
does not have the force of binding law, and the Council of Eu-
rope's Framework Convention is not yet in force and contains
provisions of a programmatic, rather than a rights-based charac-
ter. However, both documents clearly contemplate policies of
recognition and accommodation as opposed to assimilation, as
illustrated by continual reference to "the right to participate ef-
fectively."33 States have obligations not just to prevent discrimi-
nation, but "to create favorable conditions to enable persons be-
longing to minorities to express their characteristics and to de-
velop their culture, language, religion, traditions and
customs."3 4 Underlying the text of both documents is the idea
of "effective participation" in all of society's institutions. Inter-
estingly, as well as preserving inter-group contacts within the ter-
ritory, the Framework Convention and the U.N. Declaration re-
fer to the right of ethnic groups to maintain cross-border con-
tacts with ethnic counterparts in other jurisdictions. Article 2(5)
of the U.N. Declaration provides a right of minorities to main-
tain "contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States to
whom they are related by national or ethnic, religious or linguis-
tic ties."35 Under Article 17(1) of the Framework Convention,
states must undertake "not to interfere with the right of persons
belonging to national minorities to establish and maintain free
and peaceful contacts across frontiers with persons lawfully stay-
ing in other States, in particular those with whom they share an
ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, or a common cul-
gious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
RES/47/135, 32 I.L.M. 911 (1993) (hereinafter U.N. Declaration on Minorities].
32. See, e.g., Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Report of the
CSCE Committee of Experts on National Minorities, 30 I.L.M. 1692, 1695 (1991).
33. U.N. Declaration on Minorities, supra note 31, art 1.1, at 914; Council of Eu-
rope, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb. 1, 1995,
art. 5(2), 34 I.L.M. 351, 354 (1995) [hereinafter Framework Convention]. Article 5(2)
states that "[w]ithout prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general inte-
gration policy, the Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation
of persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall protect these
persons from any actions aimed at such assimilation." Id. at 354.
34. U.N. Declaration on Minorities, supra note 31, art. 4(2), at 915; see also Frame-
work Convention, supra note 33, passim.
35. U.N. Declaration on Minorities, supra note 31, art. 2(5), at 915.
1999] 1353
1354 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1345
tural heritage."36  More proactively Article 18 states that
"[p]arties shall endeavor to conclude, where necessary, bilateral
and multilateral agreements with other States, in particular
neighboring States, in order to ensure the protection of persons
belonging to the national minorities concerned." 7
II. THE BELFAST AGREEMENT, SELF-DETERMINATION,
AND MINORITY RIGHTS
Examination of the Belfast Agreement from the perspective
of international law indicates an example of an agreement that
embraces and embodies the suggested re-workings of the self-
determination norm. In this context, the Belfast Agreement has
moved towards a form of "internal self-determination" demon-
strated by four key elements:
* language dealing with self-determination,
* protection for civil, political, social, economic, and cul-
tural rights,
* an assembly with power-sharing and mutual vetoes, and
* cross-border linkages between Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland and a regional structure in the Brit-
ish-Irish Intergovernmental Conference.
The self-determination language ostensibly deals with the is-
sue directly. The civil, political, social, economic, and cultural
rights protections address the issue of lack of democracy and
equality of the state, which as we have seen were a part of the
self-determination claim. The Assembly with its power-sharing
system aims to ensure "effective participation in government" of
Unionist and Nationalist groups, a key group right to be found
in both the Framework Convention and the U.N. Declaration.
The cross-border linkage can also be seen to be a creative way of
building on the right in Articles 17 and 18 of the Framework
Convention to cross-border contacts for minorities with kin
groups in neighboring states.
Together with the British-Irish Intergovernmental Confer-
ence, this "regionalisation" of Northern Irish affairs helps to in-
tegrate the separate poles of self-determination and minority
rights by making the concepts of sovereignty, statehood, and ex-
36. Framework Convention, supra note 33, art. 17(1), at 357.
37. Id. art. 18. at 357.
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ternal interference less absolute. We will now look at these in
more detail.
A. Constitutional Issues: Explicit References to Self-determination
After a declaration of support, the Belfast Agreement opens
by addressing "Constitutional Issues." It is here that the explicit
references to self-determination can be found, although the
mechanism for documenting it is a little convoluted. The par-
ticipants to the talks endorse the commitment made by the Brit-
ish and Irish Governments to make a new British-Irish Agree-
ment, replacing the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which incorporates
the new self-determination language as set out in the following
subparagraphs. The actual text of this "British-Irish Agreement,"
which unlike the rest of the document has treaty status, is set out
at the end of the "Belfast Agreement" document. This British-
Irish Agreement restates and incorporates the provisions in para-
graph 1 of "Constitutional Issues," which includes the self-deter-
mination language in its first article. Article 2 goes on to affirm
the commitment to set up the "cross-border" institutions-the
North/South Ministerial Council, cross-border implementation
bodies to be set up by the Council, the British-Irish Council, the
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. An Annex to the
Constitutional Issues section of the Belfast Agreement provides
the actual text of legislative and constitutional changes to be
made by the British and Irish Governments to the Government
of Ireland Act 1920, and the Irish Constitution, respectively.
"Constitutional Issues," paragraph one of the Belfast Agree-
ment, is a masterpiece of ambiguity, violating all rules of legal
drafting and testifying to the political nature of the document.
In subparagraph (i), it would seem that the self-determination
issue is settled. The governments will recognize "the legitimacy of
whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of
Northern Ireland, whether they prefer to continue to support the
Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland" (empha-
sis added). Thus, the unit commanding territorial integrity
would appear to be Northern Ireland, and "the people" all of its
people (which at present would mean a Protestant majority).
However, subparagraph (ii) goes on to:
recognize that it is for the people of the Island of Ireland
alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and
1999] 13551
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without external impediment, to exercise their right of self-
determination on the basis of consent, freely and concur-
rently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ire-
land, if that is their wish, accepting that this right must be
achieved and exercised with and subject to the agreement
and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.
In its opening, this paragraph suggests that the unit for self-
determination is "the Island of Ireland" and "the people" the
people of that Island "alone." Yet then the ambiguity re-enters.
It seems that the two parts must agree separately that while exer-
cising a right to self-determination (presumably by vote) "con-
currently," it is ultimately "subject to the agreement and consent
of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland." It is the stuff of
lawyer's nightmares (or perhaps dreams). All sorts of unlikely
hypotheticals jump to mind. What happens if the North voted
by majority for Irish unification and the South did not? The
need for the consent of both parts would suggest that unification
would not happen, yet the specific need for majoritarian South-
ern consent is not reinforced, as it is in the case of the North, by
specifically subjecting unification to it. On the other hand, if it
is only the consent of a majority of people in the North that has
any practical relevance, why frame the paragraph in terms of
"the people of the island of Ireland alone" and call for a two-way
vote?
Of course the answer is simple-the above is a politician's
paragraph premised on a technique known as "constructive am-
biguity." Constructive ambiguity is a classic maneuver when
agreeing on a hotly-disputed text. Actors deliberately adopt lan-
guage that is vague and can, simultaneously, mean different
things to different people. Thus, Irish Nationalists get a refer-
ence to "the people of the island of Ireland alone," and British
Unionists get a reference to the "consent of the majority" of the
people of Northern Ireland. Each side knows that it is a "fudge"
but can live with it, and "sell" it to their own constituents as vic-
tory, or at least not a defeat. The classic problem with construc-
tive ambiguity is that it postpones real agreement until some fu-
ture date. The result is that disputes over interpretation, or the
uncertainty created by the deliberate ambiguity of the language,
may undermine the integrity of an agreement as a whole, includ-
ing areas where agreement has been reached on substance and
not just on words (as current log jams indicate).
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Subparagraph (iii) returns to the theme of consent of a ma-
jority of the people of Northern Ireland and notes that
the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ire-
land, freely exercised and legitimate, is to maintain the
Union and, accordingly, that Northern Ireland's status as part
of the United Kingdom reflects and relies upon that wish;
and that it would be wrong to make any change in the status
of Northern Ireland save with the consent of a majority of its
people.38
Subparagraph (iv) affirms that if this situation should
change and "the people of the island of Ireland" chose a united
Ireland, then "it will be a binding obligation on both Govern-
ments to introduce and support in their respective parliaments
legislation to give effect to that wish." The remaining two para-
graphs affirm that whatever choice is freely exercised, all "the
people" of the entity should be entitled to equality and rights,
and that people in Northern Ireland can identify, and hold citi-
zenship, as Irish, British, or both.
Unclear as it is, the self-determination language is not with-
out significance in international law terms. The opening of the
Constitutional section notes the "endorsement" of the parties of
the joint governmental commitment to this language. This party
endorsement was then agreed to by the people of the island of
Ireland, including a majority in the North, in the "Yes" vote. It
can therefore be argued that the choice, freely exercised, to im-
plement the Belfast Agreement was itself an exercise in self-de-
termination. The "people," whatever way they are defined,
agreed to accept the Agreement as the mechanism for devolu-
tion and political progress generally. This means that the other
often posited "solutions" to Northern Ireland, such as full incor-
poration into the United Kingdom, full and permanentjoint sov-
ereignty, and Ulster Independence, are ruled out for the time
being and until the Agreement is positively and uncategorically
rejected by both peoples. The only options that are left on the
table are either union with Britain within the framework of the
Agreement or Irish Unity achieved using the voting mechanisms
set out in the Agreement. While British legislation has only ever
contemplated the two options of full Irish or British sover-
38. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Constitutional Issues I (iii).
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eignty,"9 the Belfast Agreement with its all-Ireland vote lifts this
from being merely government policy to an exercise of self-de-
termination, and in doing so significantly reshapes both the op-
tions.
In political terms, the Belfast Agreement therefore repre-
sents a partial resolution of the competing self-determination
claims and a partial postponement of them. The self-determina-
tion claim is partially resolved through the affirmation of the
Agreement as the framework both for present government and
for future Constitutional change. The latter is supported by con-
stitutional and legislative changes in Ireland and the United
Kingdom, respectively. Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution,
which claimed territorial sovereignty over the "island of Ireland,"
including the North, have been changed giving up this claim. It
is replaced with both a right to all "persons born in the island of
Ireland" to be "part of the Irish Nation" and a recognition that
"a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means
with the consent of majority of the people, democratically ex-
pressed, in both jurisdictions in the island."4 ° Similarly, the Brit-
ish Government, in provisions now adopted in the Northern Ire-
land Act 1998,41 repeals the remaining sections of the Govern-
ment of Ireland Act 1920 and affirms that the Northern Ireland
Act "shall have effect notwithstanding any other previous enact-
ment."4 2 Debate-political and academic-has already started
around whether these previous enactments include the Acts of
Union, which are not specifically mentioned.4 3 We suggest, how-
ever, that the absence of a specific mention to the Acts of Union
is also better understood with reference to "constructive ambigu-
ity" than to legal argument. While the Belfast Agreement and
Northern Ireland Act arguably provide little change from earlier
statements as to Northern Ireland's constitutional status, such as
in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of 1973 and the Anglo-
Irish Agreement of 1985, they do provide a clear procedure
whereby the Union with Britain could be ended.4 4
39. Brigid Hadfield, The Belfast Agreement, Sovereignty and the State of the Union, 1998
PUBLIC LAW 599-616.
40. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Constitutional Issues, Annex B.
41. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, §§ 1, 2, and Sched. 1 (Eng.).
42. Id. § 2.
43. Hadfield, supra note 39.
44. See Northern Ireland Act 1998, ch. 47, § 1, sched. 1. As Hadfield notes, "sec-
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The self-determination claims are partially postponed by
several factors. Most obviously, through the lack of clarity of the
self-determination provisions. The "constructive ambiguity" acts
as a holding device for absolutist and abstract claims to self-de-
termination, which enables a process capable of delivering in-
creased participation in government for both sides. However, if
the all-Ireland vote itself is an act of self-determination, then
"Union with Britain" now has meaning, which includes the limi-
tations on majoritarianism and the cross-border cooperation also
included in the Agreement.45 Indeed, the contingency of devo-
lution is underlined by the contingency of the changes to the
Irish Constitution. If the Irish Government does not make a dec-
laration within a year of the referendum-that is by May 22,
1999-(or such longer time as they may provide for by legisla-
tion), then the changes to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution
will lapse.46 The Irish Government is not obliged to "ensure that
the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland ... take effect"
until the British-Irish Agreement comes into force and therefore
is unlikely to make the requisite declaration until that point.4 7
The British-Irish Agreement does not come into force until
three factors are fulfilled: British legislation is amended, as
agreed to in Annex A to the Belfast Agreement's "Constitutional
Issues" (this has happened with the Northern Ireland Act); the
Irish Constitutional amendments have been approved by Refer-
endum as set out in Annex B to the Belfast Agreement's "Consti-
tutional Issues" (this has happened); and the institutions re-
ferred to in Article 2 of the British-Irish Agreement (the North/
South Ministerial Council, the cross-border implementation
bodies, the British-Irish Council, and the British-Irish Intergov-
ernmental Conference) have been legislated for (this has not yet
been fully completed).4 The Constitutional amendments are
tion 1 is a provision which, at the least, would delight those of a Scottish nationalist
persuasion if an equivalent had been included in the Scotland Act 1998." Hadfield,
supra note 39, at 609.
45. Discussed more fully in the next section. Note the objections of Conor Cruise
O'Brien to the Agreement, on the very grounds that the options open to Unionism
have now been unjustifiably limited to the Agreement or Irish Unity. CONOR CRUISE
O'BRIEN, MEMOIR: My LIFE AND THEMES 435-447 (1998)
46. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Constitutional Issues, Annex B.
47. Id., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland.
48. The North/South implementation bodies have yet to be fully constituted and
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therefore contingent upon the legal establishment of these insti-
tutions and at present, this in effect includes the transfer of
power to the "cross-border" implementation bodies, which ac-
cording to the Northern Ireland Act 1998, still requires legisla-
tion from the Secretary of State or the Northern Ireland Assem-
bly.
While the clear reference to the "people of the island of
Ireland alone" may, in practical terms, seem irrelevant to the ex-
ercise of self-determination (given the need for the consent of a
majority in the North), it has immense symbolic importance. It
reaffirms the continued involvement of the people of the Repub-
lic of Ireland, and not just its government, in future major deci-
sions on the Constitutional status of the North. Indeed, it could
be argued that the clear location of self-determination in an all-
Ireland framework goes beyond the purely symbolic. In particu-
lar, it addresses one of the very problems created by the interna-
tional law of self-determination-the perpetuation of two irrec-
oncilable self-determination claims that both have validity.
Thus, the Agreement refers to the two groups, the "people of the
island of Ireland" and a "majority of the people of Northern Ire-
land,"49 arguably Irish Nationalists and British Unionists respec-
tively.50 In doing so, it addresses what Adrian Guelke has argued
is a lack of international legitimacy to the current borders and
status of Northern Ireland.5' He has argued that this interna-
tional illegitimacy is underpinned by several factors: the fact
given powers either by Order by the Secretary of State or by Act of the Assembly.
Northern Ireland Act 1998, ch. 47, §§ 53, 55.
49. Emphasis added.
50. In reviewing the United Kingdom's approach to self-determination in 1995,
McCorquodale argued that while the United Kingdom had sought to define in legisla-
tion the people of Northern Ireland as a "people," given the competing British and
Irish identities, this was legally incoherent. Robert McCorquodale, Negotiating Sover-
eignty: The Practice of the United Kingdom in Regard to the Rights of Self-determination, BT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 283, 315 (1995). We suggest that in looking at the Agreement and indeed
its precursors (examined by McCorquodale), the people of Northern Ireland are not
defined as a "people" in the same sense as the people of Scotland or Wales, but the
reference, as we have noted is to "a majority of" the people, even though this cumber-
some phrase contains a singular "people." Although the phrase, "a majority of the peo-
ple" increasingly does not mean a British Unionist majority, traditionally its usage was
code for that majority. With the Agreement vote in the North at around 71%, which is
a clear majority, reflecting a slim majority of Unionist voters, political rhetoric is cur-
rently changing to a clearer notion of a "majority of Unionist people."
51. Adrian Guelke, International Legitimacy, Self-determination and Northern Ireland, 11
REV. INT'L STUD. 37 (1985).
CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY
that application of self-determination law can be used to support
radically-opposed solutions; the dominance of nationalist self-de-
termination analysis externally; and the conflict itself, which
lends support to "external perceptions of the fragility of North-
ern Ireland's position."52 On this analysis, a vote supporting the
Agreement, which arguably constitutes an act of Irish self-deter-
mination, goes far to restore legitimacy, particularly when sup-
ported by IRA and Loyalist cease-fires.
The all-Ireland vote also addresses a lack of internal legiti-
macy alleged by Republicans to be the source of a just war of
national liberation, a position not entirely without support in in-
ternational documents, as we have seen.53 The dynamics of this
can be illustrated by examining the role of the vote to the Belfast
Agreement itself. After the breakdown of the first IRA cease-fire
in February 1996, John Hume in public statements challenged
the Provisional IRA directly to let "the people of Ireland" self-
determine not just their future, but the means that they would
choose to reach that future-violence or dialogue.54 At that
time, he asked for a vote on the issue of violence. Although this
was not taken up at that time,John Hume continued to push for
an all-Ireland vote to any agreement.55 The eventual all-Ireland
pro-Agreement vote in effect performed a similar function. As a
straight yes/no vote for a composite package, its significance as a
cross-community consensus on any one part of the package is
arguable (as current log jams illustrate). However, the vote
strongly endorses negotiation, within this particular framework,
over return to political violence.
52. Id. at 45.
53. The symbolism of the vote addressed, for example, the vote in 1918 in which
Sinn F~in won over 70% on an Irish independence platform, and which formed in part
a basis for present day legitimacy.
54. For example, in a BBC radio interview February 10, 1996, the day after the
breach of the 1995 IRA cease-fire by the Canary Wharf bomb, John Hume stated: "My
strong message to the leadership of the IRA is that since you say you believe in the right
of the Irish people to self-determination, the Irish people also have the right to self-
determine their methods, and-particularly during the visit of President Clinton, and
particularly since the cease-fire-they have made their self-determination on methodol-
ogy very, very, clear." PAUL BEW & GORDON GILLESPIE, THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE
PROCESS 1993-1996: A CHRONOLOGY 164 (1996) (quoting John Hume).
55. Of course, any change to the Republic of Ireland Constitution was always going
to need a referendum in any case.
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B. Group Accommodation: Consociational Government
The argument that the Belfast Agreement encapsulates a
notion of internal self-determination involves looking beyond
the self-determination language alone. As we have seen, the
evolution of self-determination in international law is moving
from concern with defining who a "people" is in the self-determi-
nation context, to a greater concern with what a people have a
right to in this area. Such an approach is particularly valid in
Northern Ireland where deciding the appropriate unit of the
people is especially difficult. The dilemma is that if the people's
only right is to statehood, this right is at variance with interna-
tional law principles of territorial integrity. On the other hand,
defining a people's rights purely in terms of individually-asserted
minority rights within the state ignores the more fundamental
prior challenge asserted by minorities as to the nature of that
state. The Belfast Agreement does encompass minority rights
that can be enforced individually, such as non-discrimination
rights and equality in a range of civil, political, social, and eco-
nomic rights. Thus, the many references to protection of indi-
vidual rights, through a Bill of Rights, and the human rights and
equality commissions, can be seen as part and parcel of demo-
cratic government and an aspect of internal self-determination.
However, the Agreement also includes what we suggest is a
group right that takes the "minority rights" protection beyond
negative or positive non-discrimination rights. With regard to
the Belfast Agreement, there are three main group aspects, all of
which could be said to be consistent with international instru-
ments, in particular the Framework Convention and the U.N.
Declaration. First, there is a consociational form of govern-
ment,56 where participation is linked to group membership
rather than majority decision-making. Second, the cross-border
aspects can also be seen as a creative way of fulfilling Framework
Convention programmatic rights to a connection with kin
groups in neighboring states, while at the same time copper-fast-
ening rights protection for nationalists, such as are offered in
56. The functioning of the Assembly has been adequately outlined in other con-
tributing Essays in this book. See Colin Harvey, Legality, Legitimacy, and Democratic Re-
newal: The New Assembly in Context, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1389 (1999); Brendan
O'Leary, The Nature of the Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1628 (1999).
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the Framework Convention.57 Third, the equality provisions,
which among other things place new statutory duties on public
authorities, have a clear group dimension. In particular, they
open up the possibility of a group claim through a judicial re-
view action, if the group is not consulted as specified in the
schemes to be published by all public authorities setting out how
their statutory obligation will be implemented.58
It is the provisions for power-sharing, parallel consent and
vetoes, and weighted majorities, in particular, which seek to pro-
vide for "effective participation" in government for both commu-
nities, borrowing on the South African idea of "sufficient con-
sensus" (where a majority from each community is required for
controversial decisions). Indeed, they are first introduced in the
Agreement under the heading of "Safeguards" to the Assembly,
"to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and
work together successfully ... and that all sections of the com-
munity are protected."59 In addition to the proportional repre-
sentation voting system, proportionality is extended to the whole
of government. Assembly committees established to review the
operation of each government department and their chairs and
deputies are all to be selected in proportion to party strength.6"
Ministers in charge of departments are to be selected on a
strictly proportional basis.61 This proportional approach is com-
plemented by "cross-community procedures"; certain key deci-
sions will require cross-communal support, either by a majority
of members representing each main community or by a
weighted majority of sixty percent including at least forty per-
cent of members representing each community.6 2 These deci-
sions include the appointment of a chief minister and a deputy,
the establishment of cross-border bodies, or any other matter on
57. This will be discussed further in the next section.
58. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportu-
nity, Human Rights, United Kingdom Legislation 3; id., Rights, Safeguards and Op-
portunity, New Institutions in Northern Ireland 6; see Northern Ireland Act 1998, ch.
47, §§ 75, 76, sched. 8.
'59. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in
Northern Ireland, Safeguards 1 5.
60. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Operation of
the Assembly 1 8; Northern Ireland Act 1998, § 29.
61. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in
Northern Ireland, Executive Authority 1 16; Northern Ireland Act 1998, § 18.
62. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in
Northern Ireland, Safeguards 1 5; Northern Ireland Act 1998 § 4(5).
1999] 1363
1364 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1345
the petition of at least thirty Assembly members. Each party
must opt to be counted as "Unionist," "Nationalist," or "Other,"
for the purposes of voting, 63 a matter that has been criticized as
placing center parties under pressure to align or be effectively
ignored on crucial issues.
These group rights do clearly trump individual rights, as
anti-agreement Unionists are quick to point out. Thus, anti-
agreement Unionists claim that enforced power sharing is anti-
democratic and will not work, and that cross-border cooperation
is a diminution of sovereignty. When asked what their alterna-
tive to the Agreement is, they question why Northern Ireland
cannot have the majoritarian system such as that of Scotland or
Wales. Why should Nationalists and Republicans have places as
of right in government, why should the Unionist and Nationalist
First and Deputy Ministers be co-equal? Clearly, the answer is
that unlike Scotland and Wales, Northern Ireland is a deeply-
divided society where majoritarianism exacerbates rather than
addresses communal divisions. Thus, the Belfast Agreement re-
defines self-determination by giving both of the competing "peo-
ples" a veto power as to the nature of the state. This is a form of
internal self-determination, which clearly goes beyond minimal
conditions for democratic self-governance (free elections and
basic civil and political rights) because the demographics of eth-
nic conflict mean that one group would be permanently locked
out of power with this arrangement. Indeed, the force of this
argument may mean that this mechanism would prevail even if
there is a demographic change and a majority, both North and
South, that favors Irish unity (although this is not provided for in
the Agreement or Northern Ireland Act).
It is worth noting that anti-agreement Unionist objections
mirror those of international lawyers opposed to group rights,
namely to what extent is it legitimate to have group rights, and
how are they to be reconciled with individual rights?6 4 Does con-
sociationalism conflict with a more traditional notion of self-de-
termination as inherently majoritarian, or individual rights, such
as to equality? However, most commentators seem agreed that
63. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in
Northern Ireland, Operation of the Assemby 6; Northern Ireland Act 1998, § 4(5).
64. See David Wippman, Practical and Legal Constraints on Internal Power Sharing, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 211.
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in deeply-divided societies, "consociationalism is not only com-
patible with self-determination but may be the only way to give
effect to self-determination that is consistent with the rights of
minorities to effective political participation."65
C. Cross-Border Contacts and "Regionalism":
Watering Down Sovereignty
The final component to the "internal self-determination"
package is the provision for cross-border elements, and also re-
gional British-Irish cooperation (what O'Leary has called the
"plus" factor).66 There are several elements. Most obviously, the
Strand Two North/South Ministerial Council and implementa-
tion bodies for cross-border cooperation, and the Strand Three
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, but also the cross-
border vote, as already discussed, and the joint human rights
committee of the two new Human Rights Commissions.67 To-
gether, these structures give government in Northern Ireland a
new supra-state structure. Although not obviously related to self-
determination, these structures tap into "new trends currently
emerging in the world community towards both greater political
and economic integration at the 'supranational' level and, at the
same time, the growing emphasis on the ethnic and cultural dis-
tinctiveness of groups, at the 'intrastate' level."6 The effect of
these apparently contradictory trends is a "weakening of the
traditional national-State, which is gradually losing its authority
and legitimacy. '"69 This again enables self-determination "solu-
tions," which begin to transcend the sovereignty/territorial in-
tegrity versus minority rights divide and, as Cassese has sug-
gested, may be useful in divided societies."
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPLICATIONS
The Belfast Agreement, in summary, plays out in practice
the current normative trend towards a gradually expanding legal
65. Id. at 230; see CASSESE, supra note 9, at 353. However, it is worth noting that in
South Africa international consensusdid not support a consociational type arrange-
ment to protect white minority rights, except as a transitional arrangement.
66. See generally Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Strand Two.
67. Id., Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, A Joint Committee, 10.
68. CASSESE, supra note 9, at 362.
69. Id.
70. Id.
1999] 1365
1366 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1345
principle of internal self-determination. Self-determination is
dealt with by explicitly using the language of self-determination,
coupled with institutional mechanisms that move away from ab-
solute notions of statehood, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
Second, human rights are guaranteed to all groups equally, re-
gardless of where borders are, or how they might change in the
future, taking the "sting" out of whichever constitutional ar-
rangement might prevail. Third, effective participation of all
groups in decision-making is guaranteed by a consociational ar-
rangement (power-sharing and mutual vetoes). Fourth, the en-
tire Agreement is copper-fastened through "regional" mecha-
nisms that reassure competing nationalisms and potentially offer
new ways of thinking about sovereignty and, indeed, new ways of
"getting government done."'" Indeed, it is interesting to com-
pare the Belfast Agreement with Prof. Asbjorn Eide's 1996 publi-
cation for the Irish Forum for Peace and Reconciliation set up
after the cease-fires, as well as Cassese's blueprint for dealing
with self-determination and what he calls the "new tribalism" of
ethnic conflict.7 2 Their proposals for how group accommoda-
tion could take place in accordance with international instru-
ments have much in common with the Belfast Agreement. The
Agreement is responsive, in particular, to the plea to fuse the
area of self-determination and minority rights in a creative way,
thus overcoming the tension between territorial integrity and
minority rights in the current normative standards. Overcoming
this tension is vital to international law if it is to address ethnic
conflict effectively.73
The compatibility of the Agreement with international law
developments was not, of course, a coincidental convergence of
political pragmatism with international law standards. It is clear
from analysis of contributing paragraphs, phrases, and ideas to
the Agreement, that international law formed an important
backdrop to negotiations.7" At key moments, parties felt they
had to address international law, and on other occasions it gave
71. John Morison, Constitutionalism and Change: Representation, Governance, and Par-
ticipation in the New Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1608 (1999).
72. Eide, supra note 12, at 341; CASSESE, supra note 9, at 341.
73. BOUTROS-BOUTROUS GALI, AGENDA FOR PEACE (1992).
74. This influence by international law did not 'just happen" and was, of course,
the fruit of many years of hard work by groups and individuals, and in particular, the
Committee on the Administration of Justice.
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parties new ways of relating to the conflict. In turn, the Belfast
Agreement may give support to current trends in international
law in developing the notion of internal self-determination, and
more abstractly, in bolstering a conceptualization of minority
rights and self-determination whereby they are not two alterna-
tive branches of law for two different types of situation. This is
an approach to internal self-determination that expands on, but
is broadly in line with, the traditional U.K. approach to self-de-
termination.75
Berman's insight, noted in our introduction, of a complex
interaction between law, states, and ethnic groups, is reaffirmed
in this process. For Republicans, agreement could only have
been reached when their self-determination claims were ad-
dressed. The history of the self-determination paragraph is be-
yond the scope of this Essay, save to say that the formulation as
first accepted by the British Government in the Downing Street
Declaration was vital to reaching the first IRA cease-fire.76 As we
have pointed out, John Hume also saw the value of making non-
violent method itself a self-determination issue. This viewpoint
answered the Provisional IRA's national liberation agenda,
which drew support from international standards and conflicts
elsewhere.
Similarly, however, in debating whether to enter talks,
Unionists reframed their claim from a right to majoritarianism
to one of "consent." In essence, this reframing was a shift to self-
determination language-a claim that Unionists should not be
forced into a form of government or a different state against
75. See McCorquodale, supra note 50.
76. Downing Street Declaration, paragraph 4, stated:
The British Government agree that it is for the people of the island of Ireland
alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right
of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given,
North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish.... [Ilt
would be wrong to attempt to impose a united Ireland, in the absence of the
freely given consent of the people of Northern Ireland.... [T]he Irish Gov-
ernment [accepts] that the democratic fight of self-determination by the peo-
ple of Ireland as a whole must be achieved and exercised with the consent of a
majority of the people of Northern Ireland.
Joint Declaration issued by the Prime Minister, the Right Honorable John Major M.P.,
and the Taoiseach, Mr. Albert Reynolds T.D. (Downing Street Declaration of 1993),
Dec. 15, 1993, U.K.-Ir., Cm. 2442. For a fuller account of the influences on the IRA
cease-fire, see E. MALLIE & DAVID MCKITTRICK, THE FIGHT FOR PEACE: THE SECRET STORY
BEHIND THE IRISH PEACE PROCESS (1996).
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their freely-determined choice. They also used international in-
struments to argue for an internal solution. In particular, Ulster
Unionists made reference to C/OSCE standards, taking comfort
from their references to "the integrity of borders."7 But this as-
sertion was not without consequence. Along with territorial in-
tegrity went human rights protections and minority rights. Ar-
guably, this was one of the elements that moved key Ulster
Unionist elites to a position where they accepted the affirmation
that Northern Ireland as a political entity could and should go
hand in hand with increased human rights protection and even
group rights. International standards also gave some room for
negotiation with more traditional party members who saw
Unionism's claims as claims to'a Unionist nation-state, rather
than to pluralism. Under this traditional view, Northern Ireland
is comprised of loyal British citizens, and those who dissent from
this position constitute the disloyal "other" whose disloyalty can-
not be accommodated. This view still characterizes, for exam-
ple, current Democratic Unionist Party rhetoric of "ordinary citi-
zens" (those with a pro-Union allegiance). Others do not regis-
ter as a significant part of the polity. The Framework
Convention was of course a child of CSCE documents and,
therefore, relevant as well. It was only in January 1997 that the
British Government exhibited a serious intent to bring the talks
to an end game by publishing the heads of agreement docu-
ments. Interestingly, January 1997 was also the month in which
they ratified the Framework Convention, 78 despite the fact that
British Governments had traditionally denied the need for mi-
nority rights on the grounds that protection for individual rights
was sufficient. Indeed, one Ulster Unionist Party politician has
claimed in private that ratification took place on their insistence.
To the extent that Unionists used the Framework Convention, it
was to claim that it underwrote territorial integrity. But of
course the convention also refers to cross-border linkages and
rights to effective participation in all aspects of public life.
Unionists insisted that cross-border linkages were purely cultural
and did not imply any "right" to executive power for neighbor-
ing states with kin groups, such as was being contemplated in the
cross-border bodies. Yet it does seem that when a crucial logjam
77. A Blueprint for Stability, (Ulster Unionist Party), Feb. 28, 1994, at 6-7.
78. Ratified January 15, 1998.
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over the role and scope of cross-border bodies was reached,
which had become whittled away until it hinged on whether they
were free standing or subordinate to the Assembly, discussion of
the Framework Convention came into play.
International law also, of course, affected the other human
rights aspects of the Agreement such as the Bill of Rights, polic-
ing and criminal justice provisions, and equality and the mecha-
nisms for enforcement, a matter that is dealt with more fully else-
where in this collection.79 It is worth noting, however, that this
case also tells of the complex interaction between international
and local interventions whereby each informs the other. Fur-
ther, one important consequence of the international law basis
to articulating human rights concerns was to influence human
rights developments in the South of Ireland as embodied in the
Agreement. Of particular note was the establishment of a paral-
lel Human Rights Commission in the South, with a joint Com-
mittee with the one in the North. The overarching commitment
to "ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human
rights as will pertain in Northern Ireland," including considera-
tion of incorporating the European Convention on Human
Rights,"0 reflected the political irresistibility of mutuality in
rights, which flowed from making international law arguments
that by their very nature applied to the South as well as the
North. It also flowed from the breaking down of the border's
relevance through mechanisms such as the cross-border bodies.
Of course, political pressures are messy, conflicting, and para-
doxical. Republicans saw mutual rights protection as part of the
all-Ireland dimension, and Unionists saw it as saying "if you're
going to shove this down our throats you're going to have it as
well."81 But it did happen.
Finally, while full analysis of the negotiation dynamics sur-
rounding the "regional" aspects of the Agreement is beyond the
scope of this chapter, it is important to note that the British-Irish
Council was for Unionists a mechanism that mitigated and
changed the significance of the North/South cross-border bod-
79. Chris McCrudden, Mainstreaming Equality in the Governance of Northern Ireland,
22 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 1696 (1999).
80. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportu-
nity, Comparable Steps by the Irish Government.
81. Ann Marie Hourihane, King of the Hill, SUNDAY TRIBUNE, Dec. 27, 1998 (quot-
ing from interview with Stephen King of Ulster Unionist Party).
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ies, so crucial to settlement for Nationalists and Republicans.
The fact that both Unionists and Nationalists were able to recon-
cile their competing sovereign claims, in part, by adopting these
overarching structures, lends support to this type of supra-state
arrangement as useful to resolving competing self-determination
claims.
IV. THE BELFAST AGREEMENT AS INTERNATIONAL MODEL
We began by asking whether the Belfast Agreement pro-
vides a possible model for other ethnic conflicts. Our analysis
suggests that just as it borrowed from other processes (with con-
cepts such as "sufficient consensus" borrowed from South Af-
rica), so may it, in turn, provide a model for other divided socie-
ties. The idea of cross-border cooperation as transcending tradi-
tional notions of statehood, sovereignty, and territorial integrity
may be a useful one to consider in other conflicts where neigh-
boring states form kin groups with a minority, such as Kashmir,
Sri Lanka, or Kosovo, controversial or unrealistic as this might
seem at present in any of these situations. However, where there
is no kin group neighbor or where populations are more territo-
rially segregated than in Northern Ireland, the more flexible no-
tion of sovereignty and statehood is more likely to take shape in
autonomous government for regions. This raises quite different
problems of balance between individual and minority rights,
which are played out in the balance between central and re-
gional power, and the rights protections offered to "new" minor-
ities at the regional level. Experience has indicated that such
solutions may be difficult to implement coherently after sus-
tained and intensive war (as Bosnia illustrates).82 Further, rather
than stemming secessionist claims, as recent experience in for-
mer Czechoslovakia and former Yugoslavia indicates, granting
autonomy may fuel them.8"
The importance of the Belfast Agreement to international
lawyers may, however, lie more intangibly in its demonstration
that political pragmatism can be reconciled with international
law. International lawyers can, with some excitement, point to a
deal that has struck a balance between minority rights and self-
determination and that conforms closely to international stan-
82. Wippman, supra note 64.
83. CASSESE, supra note 9, at 363.
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dards. The Belfast Agreement can give new hope that this con-
fused area of law, so often charged with creating conflict, may
very well contribute to resolving conflict in divided societies.
That is, of course, if the Belfast Agreement works.
